ASSESSING CHIEFJUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST'S COURT
MARK TUSHNET t

In response to Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessing ChiefJustice William
Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1331 (2006).
Professor Chemerinsky's interesting article' shows-sometimes
expressly, more often indirectly-why periodization is one of the recurrent issues in historiography. His article blends an evaluation of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's contributions to constitutional law with a
more extended discussion of the changes in constitutional law that
occurred during William Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice. In this
comment I want to focus primarily on the second theme, though with
some attention to the first.
I begin with a question: why should we think that "the Rehnquist
Court" identifies an analytically significant period in constitutional
history?2 In the course of addressing that question, I will agree with
Professor Chemerinsky's comment that constitutional law as of 2005
was substantially more conservative than it was in 1986, but raise some
questions about exactly how conservative the law became, and about
exactly how it became conservative-that is, the extent to which the
change can be attributed to ChiefJustice Rehnquist.
Taking "the Rehnquist Court" as our initial periodization, we
might develop a more finely grained analysis or a less finely grained
one. Professor Chemerinsky elaborates on Professor Merrill's more
finely grained "two Rehnquist Courts" thesis by adding a third
Rehnquist Court, which occupied the final years of Rehnquist's tentre. The "three Rehnquist Courts" thesis faces a problem that Professor Merrill's does not. Professor Merrill divides the Rehnquist Court

William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Hai vard Law School.
I Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessig (hi e]Justice William Rehuquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
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2 As does Professor Chemerinsky, I put aside
the contributions Chief Justice
Rehnquist made to the administration of the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary.
On those matters, I do think that "the Rehnquist Court" identifies a period distinct
fhorn that of his immediate predecessor, who was a notoriously bad administrator who
thought he was a good one.
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into two periods measured, roughly but accurately enough, by
changes in personnel in the early 1990s. 3 But, as Professor Chemerinsky observes, the Court's composition did not change between Justice
Breyer's appointment and the Chief Justice's death. What then accounts for the emergence of a third Rehnquist Court?
Professor Chemerinsky suggests that the Court's liberals simply
became more persuasive to the Court's centrists. That strikes me as
implausible, if only because that account contains nothing to explain
the timing of the third Rehnquist Court's emergence: why and how
did the liberals become more persuasive in 2003 than they had been
in 1998? One possibility is that the issues the third Rehnquist Court
faced-or, given the Justices' power to control their docket, the issues
it chose to face-were simply different from those the earlier
Rehnquist Courts had faced. That is certainly what the Court says
when, for example, it distinguishes congressional regulation of marijuana in Gonzalez v. Raich' from congressional regulation of guns near
schools in United States v. Lopez. ' Still, the "new issues" explanation is
not completely satisfying when we have to deal with cases overruling
earlier decisions. The Court did treat Roper v. Simmons as involving
new facts that justified the invalidation of the imposition of the death
penalty on offenders who committed their crimes asjuveniles.6 But in
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court said that the decision it overruled was
wrong at the moment it was decided, and so cannot readily be fit into
a "new issues" account.'
There is one thing thatS might
explain why there was a third
8
Rehnquist Court: Bush v. Gore. The argument would be that Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy came to believe that what they had done in
Bush v. Gore threatened the Court institutionally by sapping the support the Court had built tip among liberals (and that such support was
necessary, perhaps because it was unlikely to be replaced by new support from conservatives).t Arguably, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy

Thomas W. Merrill, The Making nfthe Second Rehnquist Cotr: A PreliminaryAnaysis, 47 ST. LOuIS U. L.J. 569, 569-70 (2003) (dividing the Rehnquist Court into two periods: first, frorn October 1986 toJuly 1994, and second, f-on October 1994 and continning through the date of the article).
4 545 U.S.
1 (2005).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
7 539 U.S. 558,
578 (2003).
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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could begin the process of rebuilding that support by joining the
Court's liberals more frequently.
The "three Rehnquist Courts" argument is problematic for another reason: the third Rehnquist Court, if it existed, did so-qua
Rehnquist Court-for only a very short time. In the scope of constitutional history, the third Rehnquist Court might turn out to be just a
hiccup.
Or perhaps not, if we move in the opposite direction, away from
more finely grained periodizations and toward less finely grained
ones. Doing so, though, will mean that we have to abandon the practice of marking out periods in the Court's history with the names of
Chief Justices."' Consider "the Warren Court." The usage of that
term is so embedded that no one is likely to displace it. But, it is
pretty clearly an inaccurate way of identifying a significant period in
constitutional history. With respect to "the Warren Court," too, we
might become more finely grained, distinguishing between the early
Warren Court, from 1954 to around 1962, and what Professor Powe
calls "history's Warren Court," which came into existence with the apJpointIfents of Byron White and Arthur Goldberg.'' Or, as I would
prefer, we could note that Warren Court liberalism persisted after
Warren's retirement. So, for example, Roe v. Wade12 is a "Warren
Court"-like decision even though it was decided several years after
Warren left the Court.
Perhaps, as some have suggested, we ought to talk about a "Brennan Court" to capture the persistence of Warren Court liberalism into
the 1970s and even the 1980s.13 The difficulty here is that, if Chief Justice Warren did not serve through the entire period of what we try to
describe as the Warren Court, Justice Brennan served too long, into a
period plainly different from the one in which he and his vision flourished.
A better approach, I believe, lies in abandoning the practice of
identifying "Courts" with individual Justices. The periodization that
Justices might think it sensible to maintain a portfolio of supporters fr-om across the
political spectrum, and so might seek to rebuild support lost by a particular decision.
10For an earlier discussion of the problem of the "Chief Justice synthesis,"
see
Mark Tushnet, Pragmatism andfJudgment: A Comment on Luind, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 289,
289 (2004).
11 See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
209-11
(2000) (describing the effect of the deaths of two liberal justices and the subsequent
appointment ofJustices White and Goldberg).
12 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
131POWE, supra note 11, at 499 (noting that some scholars have answered in
the
affirmative the question "Wasn't it really the Brennan Couiit?").
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best captures what happened to constitutional law during much of the
second half of the twentieth century yields the label, "the New
Deal/Great Society Court." That label captures the large sweep of liberal constitutionalism from the early 1940s through the mid-1980s, a
period that includes the dominance in the political branches first of
the Democratic Party's coalition of northern liberals and southern
conservatives, then of the liberal Democratic Party, and finally the
Democratic Party's decline. Of course liberalism itself changed during this long period, but, roughly speaking, at each point the Supreme
Court carried out the political agenda of important segments of the
Democratic coalition.
In this light, we might see the Supreme Court in the late twentieth
century as the "Conservative Movement Court." 14 The resurgence of
political conservatism starting with Barry Goldwater, and moving
through Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan, Newt Gingrich, and
George W. Bush, eventually created a conservative movement that
dominated the political branches. As had the New Deal/Great Society
Court for liberalism, the Conservative Movement Court articulatedin constitutional law-policies that mattered
to important comJpo1
nents of the conservative political coalition. 5
This perspective helps us understand, too, the individual contribution Chief Justice Rehnquist made to constitutional law. In my
view, the best analyses make the simple point that constitutional law
changed but Chief Justice Rehnquist (lid not change it.'1 He started
out conservative, and did not, by the force of his arguments or personality, change anyone's mind. The Court moved to the right, but
Chief Justice Rehnquist contributed only a single vote to pulling it in
that direction. Rehnquist was joined on the Court by Justices whoantecedently, and for reasons largely independent of Rehnquist's own
articulation of a conservative view of constitutional law-agreed with
him.

14 An

alternative would be to call it "the Reagan Court," but, foi reasons I discuss
below, doing so might mistakenly truncate the period we are attempting to describe
(just as giving the nid-twentieth century Court the label "the Roosevelt Court" Would).
1I emphasize that the conservative movement was, as the Democratic Party had
been, a coalition, so that we can avoid the mistake of thinking that the Supreme Court
deviates from a unified conservative agenda when it articulates doctrines appealing to,
say, the libertarian elements in the conservative movement and then articulates doctrines anathema to those elements but appealing to social conservatives. (I have in
mind here the combination of lawrevce v. Texa.swith Gonzalez v. Rach.)
16Fo" a useful collection of essays about Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure on
the
Court, see THE REHNQUIST LEGACY (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006).
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Although the shift was largely independent of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, it was not completely independent of him.
What
Rehnquist contributed to the transformation of constitutional lawmore as an Associate Justice than as Chief Justice-was that he gave
conservative legal thinkers someone to point to when they argued that
the positions they advanced were what the Constitution really meant.
Absent an articulate voice for such positions on the Supreme Court,
such arguments might have floated free from any connection to actual
constitutional law.
To this extent, then, my analysis is consistent with Professor
Chemerinsky's: constitutional law after Chief Justice Rehnquist was
more conservative than it had been before. And no surprise: we cannot expect conservative domination of the political branches to go
unrecognized in constitutional law, if only because of the effects of
new appointments. But there remains a question of exactly how conservative constitutional law has become.
In my book A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and the Future of
Constitutional Law I argue that constitutional law has not yet been
revolutionized.
I do not deny that contemporary constitutional law
is different from the constitutional law created by the New Deal/Great
Society Court, but I do claim that contemporary constitutional law has
modified the law it inherited around the edges, while preserving its
central legacy, most notably a national government with expansive
(albeit not unlimited) power to regulate economic matters. It is one
thing to observe that the Rehnquist Court invalidated national legislation on Commerce Clause grounds for the first time in nearly sixty
years, as Professor Chemerinsky rightly does; it is another to suggest,
as he
does not, that United States v. Lopez's and United States v. Morri1')
son have dramatically reduced the national government's regulatory
authority. A Court Divided argues that we can see the same pattern
across the Rehnquist Court's decisions: bold thrusts and rapid withdrawals, leaving New Deal/Great Society constitutionalism nicked and
bleeding a little, but still standing reasonably firm.
I do not mean that description to suggest that the "Conservative

17 See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED:
TURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FULAW 12 (2005) (arguing that Rehnquist "laid the ground-

work" for a revolution that "has not yet occurred").
is514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not give the
federal government power to regulate intrastate activity lacking a substantial effect on
interstate commerce).
1 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (restricting the power of the federal government to
regulate, under the Commerce Clause, intrastate violence).
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Movement Court" label is inaccurate, though. My point in A Court Divided is that it was then, and still is (in my view), too early to come to a
firm judgment on what happened to constitutional law in the late
twentieth century. It might be that the Conservative Movement Court
placed constitutional law on a trajectory that will transform the law
dramatically over the next decade or two. Justice Souter ended his
dissent in Lopez with a description of how early New Deal decisions
might not have seemed so dramatic at the time, and closed with the
understated, "But we know what happened."' That might be true of
the decisions of the 1990s, in which case we will be able to say with
confidence that the Supreme Court from the mid-1980s was the Conservative Movement Court-nascent in the last decades of the twentieth century, triumphant in the first decades of the twenty-first.
My argument so far is that the last chapter of the story about contemporary constitutional law has not yet been written, which implies
that we cannot yet be sure what the correct large-grained periodization is. In work written before A Court Divided, and even more obviously captive to the future, I basically suggested that what you see is
what you get.2 1 That is, the "Conservative Movement Court" label
treats the period from 1980 to now as the first years of a long transition from liberal to conservative constitutional law, and suggests that
the gradual nature of this transformation is simply a distraction from
the main story. "What you see is what you get" suggests, in contrast,
that there has not been-and, again projecting into the future, will
not be-the kind of transformation that the "Conservative Movement
Court" label suggests.
Rather, I argued, we had-and on this view still have, and will
have-a Supreme Court that reflected the divided nature of our overall political order. Of course the Court drifted to the right as unified
Democratic control of the government was replaced first by divided
government and then by unified Republican control. But, on this version of the story, there is no strong reason to think that unified Republican control will persist. And, if divided government is restored
(and even if unified Democratic government returns briefly), the Suprelfe Court will drift to the left.
I described the Court of the 1990s as one of chastened constitutional ambitions, born out of the divided government in which it was
inserted. Professor Sunstein gives a more normative spin to that

20 514

U.S. at 615 (SouterJ., dissenting).

21 See MARK TUSHNET, A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
(2003).
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Court's description, praising the Court for its minimalist decisions. 2
Consistent with my interest in attaching labels that indicate the relationship between the Supreme Court and the larger political order, I
now think a good label would be "the Court of Divided Government."
I have indicated throughout that labels help us think about the
claims underlying our periodizations. What label, then, should be
used if the story I have just told turns out to be the correct one? I suspect that people will be tempted again to useJiustices' names as labels.
So, for example, we might want to say that the Brennan Court was replaced by the Stevens Court, or even that the Roberts Court turned
out to reflect Chief Justice Roberts's (imputedly) more moderate conservatism. We should resist those temptations, I believe. The best
candidates for an accurate periodization are these: either (1) The
New Deal/Great Society Court was followed by the Conservative
Movement Court, or (2) the New Deal/Great Society Court was followed by the Court of Divided Government. Those of us who live long
enough will know which it is (or was).

See id. at 130-38 (discussing Professor Stinstein's approach).

